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I. INTRODUCTION
Brenda is a full-time sixth-grader at Charlotte Christian Academy,
a private non-denominational school in Michigan. She has her own
musical instrument, but the academy does not offer a band course.
Brenda's parents are concerned that their daughter will be denied the
opportunity to develop her talent, so they look for an alternative. Her
parents soon learn that the Charlotte Public School District offers the
desired course.
Brenda and her parents do not ask for special accommodations.
Like any other family, they pay property taxes to support the school
district in which they live. Her parents are willing to transport their
daughter to and from class, and Brenda is able to attend band class at
the same time and place as her public school classmates. The school
district admits that there is room for Brenda, and moreover, it would
receive state school aid to cover the additional cost of her part-time
attendance. However, the school district refuses to admit Brenda. It is
against school district policy to admit any private or homeschool
students. Only full-time, public school students are allowed to take
classes in the school district.' So, barring a change in the legal status
quo, Brenda will have to learn to play her favorite musical instrument on
her own. Her parents sue.
Mounting two arguments, Brenda's parents claimed that excluding
their daughter violated her (1) state statutory and (2) federal
constitutional rights. In a 4-3 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Brenda. Though the Justices discussed the federal
constitutional issues, they based their decision on a state statute that
purported to grant residents, like Brenda, the "right to attend school in
[their] district. ,2 The statute did not mention full-time status as a public
school student as a prerequisite or requirement for this "right to
attend. -3 And so, one lawsuit and several appeals later, Brenda got to
go to band class.
1. Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. 1984).
2. Id. at 169. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1147 (2007).
3. Snyder, 365 N.W.2d at 154.
2007]
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This true story highlights a winning litigation strategy for private
school and homeschool families that want to defend their children's right
to participate in public school programs on a part-time basis. 4 In recent
years, countless private and homeschool students have been turned away
from public school classes, extracurricular activities, and sports.5 Many
of their parents have sued under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution alleging free exercise, due process, and
equal protection violations.6  However, these federal claims are seldom,
if ever, successful. 7  More often than not, the courts apply a rational
4. See id. at 156 (holding that various state statutes, "when read together... guarantee children
the right to attend neighborhood public schools, but gives them the option of obtaining their
education at other facilities"). But see Thomas v. Allegany County Bd. of Educ., 443 A.2d 622, 627
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (reaching an opposite conclusion to the Snyder court, based on virtually
identical state statutory arguments); Reid v. Kenowa Hills Pub. Schs., 680 N.W.2d 62, 66-68 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2004) (limiting the Snyder court's right to attend by distinguishing between non-core
classes, e.g., band class, that are open to nonpublic students and extracurricular activities, e.g.,
athletics, that are closed to nonpublic students).
5. See Paul J. Batista & Lance C. Hatfield, Learn at Home, Play at School: A State-by-State
Examination of Legislation, Litigation and Athletic Association Rules Governing Public School
Athletic Participation by Homeschool Students, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 213, 223 (2005)
(describing how, as of 2005, a majority of states prohibit homeschool students from participating in
public school sports). Broken down by category, the data reveals that: "In 16 of the 23 states that
allow homeschool students to participate, state legislatures have adopted statutory provisions
allowing participation. The states with existing statutes are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont and Washington. In the other seven states allowing participation, Alaska, California,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wyoming, statutes do not exist, but
participation is authorized by rules of the state high school athletic/activities association"".... In 23
states, homeschool students are prohibited from competing on public school athletic teams by virtue
of the rules of the state high school athletic/activities association: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. State courts in four other states (Maryland, Michigan, Montana, and
New York) have determined that state law does not allow homeschool students to participate." Id. at
224, 240. North Carolina does not permit private or homeschool families to participate in public
school athletics. Id. at 243. Further, the North Carolina Division of Non-public Education has
interpreted section 115C-563(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes to prohibit homeschool
students from taking core classes like "language arts, math, science and social studies" in public
school. North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Frequently Asked Home School
Question Topics, http://www.ncdnpe.org/hhhl 14h.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-563(a) (2007). Finally, local school boards have the discretion to prohibit
homeschool students from taking noncore classes. See Lisa M. Lukasik, The Latest Home Education
Challenge: The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1913,
1973 n.368 (1996) (describing how, in the absence of statutory or regulatory authority, section
115C-40 gives local school boards the discretion to accept or deny nonpublic students); NEIL G.
PEDERSON AND STEPHEN A. SCROGGs, NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL
ACTIVITIES (February 20, 2004),
http://www.chccs.kl 2.nc.us/Board/03042004Agenda/Nonpublicschcover.pdf (reviewing the "current
policy and law concerning the participation of non-public school students in [public] school
activities" for the benefit of a local school board).
6. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Me. Principals' Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12-13 (D. Me. 2003) (parents
and school argued that excluding homeschool students from private school athletics violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution); Jesuit Coll. Preparatory Sch. v.
Judy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 520, 529-35 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (parents and school argued that excluding
private school students from joining a public school athletics league violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution).
7. See, e.g., Pelletier, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 13-17 (holding that excluding homeschool students from
HeinOnline  -- 13 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 4 2007
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basis review to judge the exclusion of these students, and this low
standard of review almost predetermines an unfavorable outcome. 8
But Brenda's story provides hope. State law can support an
alternative theory for contesting the exclusion of private and homeschool
students from public school programs. 9  "[E]very single state's
constitution addresses the state legislature's responsibility to provide for
a public school system."' These educational rights provisions in state
constitutions can provide a unique, textual basis to argue for rights apart
from and beyond the federal constitution."1 State statutes can also
provide a basis for these rights. 12
Both private and homeschool families have a lot to gain from equal
access to public school programs. 13  Even though many private schools
have their own sports leagues and band classes, no institution can offer a
perfectly comprehensive curriculum. 14  Inevitably, some private school
students will want to participate in programs that are not offered by their
institution.15  Like Brenda, they stand to benefit from equal access to a
public school system that does offer the desired class or sport.' 6
Homeschoolers often have an even harder time trying to establish
private school athletics did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution); Jesuit Coll. Preparatory Sch., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 529-35 (holding that excluding
private school students from joining public school athletics leagues did not violate the First or
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution); William Grob, Access Denied.
Prohibiting Homeschooled Students From Participating in Public-School Athletics and Activities, 16
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 823, 836 (2000) (asserting that "parents cannot rely on the First or Fourteenth
Amendments when they argue that homeschoolers have a constitutional right to access public-school
athletics or activities if the students' primary educational venue is the home").
8. Grob, supra note 7, at 831-36 (discussing various cases where the Court found no
constitutional violation under the First and Fourteenth Amendment brought by the parents of the
nonpublic students seeking equal access). But see Davis v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 3
Mass. L. Rep. 375 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995) (granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Massachusetts public school system from excluding a homeschool student from participating on a
public girls' softball team; the court held that excluding the student violated equal protection under a
rational basis review because the sole reason she was excluded was her classification as a
homeschool student, and legal homeschooling is "academically equivalent" to public schooling in
Massachusetts).
9. See supra note 4.
10. Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech,
Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 64 n.5
(2002) (paraphrasing MARTHA M. MCCARTHY ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND
STUDENTS' RIGHTS 2 (4th ed. 1998)).
11. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (holding that the state constitution
provides "every child" in North Carolina with the right to "an opportunity to receive a sound basic
education" in public school).
12. See supra note 4.
13. Brenda's case is a paradigm for why private and homeschool families want to participate in
public school programs on a part-time basis. See Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d
151, 153 (Mich. 1984). When a child's private school or homeschool does not offer a desired class
or sport, but the local public school system does, part-time participation in public school is a logical
answer. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
HeinOnline  -- 13 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 5 2007
6 TEXAS JOURNAL ON CIVIL LIBERTIES & CIVIL RIGHTS [Vol. 13:1
their own interschool activities and specialized classes.' 7 Except in
unique circumstances,18 homeschool families have fewer resources and
less coordination than most private schools. 19 Thus, they are even more
likely to push the issue of participating in public school programs on a
part-time basis. o
Though out-numbered by their public and private school
counterparts, the number of homeschoolers in the United States is on the
rise."' In 1999, there were an estimated 850,000 students being
homeschooled in the United States. 2  In 2003, that number increased to
1,096,000.23 Judging by this upward trend, the actual number of
homeschool students is likely much higher today.
What accounts for this upward trend in the number of homeschool
students? As the practice of homeschooling becomes more
24
mainstream, an increasing number of families are teaching their
children at home for the same reasons that others send their offspring to
private schools. 25  Traditionally, homeschooling has been viewed as an
alternative for very religious families, 26 who fear that public schools
teach a religion (or anti-religion) called secular humanism. 27 In 2003, a
majority of homeschool students were not members of families that
reported religion as their "most important reason" for teaching their
17. In North Carolina, "'[h]ome school' means a nonpublic school in which one or more children
of not more than two families or households receive academic instruction from parents or legal
guardians, or a member of either household." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-563(a). As such, the largest
homeschools in North Carolina consist of two families, and the curriculum that homeschools can
provide is limited to what the members of those two families are capable of offering. See id.
18. But some homeschool-sponsored athletic programs do exist. Hal Young, Extra-Curricular
Activities Grow for Homeschoolers, CAROLINA JOURNAL, April 2006, at 10. North Carolinians for
Home Education, "the state's largest homeschooling organization," has sponsored basketball
tournaments for homeschool students. Id.
19. See supra note 17.
20. See supra note 17.
21. Grob, supra note 7, at 825 ("Commentators estimate that the number of parents choosing to
homeschool their children has increased five-fold in the past decade."); DANIEL PRINCIOTTA,
STACEY BIELICK, & CHRISTOPHER CHAPMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, HOMESCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003 2 (February 2006),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006042.pdf ("Estimated number and 95 percent confidence interval for
number of homeschooled students, ages 5 through 17 with a grade equivalent of kindergarten
through 12th grade: 1999 and 2003").
22. PRINCIorA, BIELICK, & CHAPMAN, supra note 21, at 2.
23. Id.
24. Grob, supra note 7, at 825 ("What many once called a religious 'fringe' movement today has
become mainstream.").
25. Id. at 825-26 (detailing how "[p]arents choose to homeschool their children for many reasons
.... includ[ing] general dissatisfaction with the local curriculum, the presence of disruptive behavior
in schools, and parents' need to spend more time interacting with their children").
26. Id. (describing how homeschool was once "called a religious 'fringe' movement").
27. Sheila Jasanoff, Biology And The Bill Of Rights: Can Science Reframe The Constitution?, 13
AM. J. L. & MED. 249, 286-287 (1987) (describing "secular humanism" as a movement "from a
God-centered to a human-centered view of the universe" that is under attack by some
"fundamentalist" students and judges, who label it as a "religion" that is being unconstitutionally
imposed in public schools).
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children at home.28 Only 29.8% of these students were members of a
family which reported that they homeschooled their children "[t]o
provide religious or moral instruction., 29  Instead, the most popular
reason for homeschooling was "[c]oncem about [the] environment of
other schools.
30
In North Carolina, the number of both private and homeschool
students is rising.31 In the 1973-1974 school term, there were 53,315
students in private school, representing 4.4% of the total student
population. 32  By 2004-2005, this number had increased to 91,084
students, representing 6% of the student population.33 By comparison, in
1973-1974, there were no reported students being homeschooled in
North Carolina. 34  By 2004-2005, however, there were 58,780
students-representing 3.8% of the total student population-being
homeschooled. 35
These substantial and increasing numbers of nonpublic students
represent a powerful interest group that stands to benefit considerably
from a state court ruling in its favor. First, this data indicates that there is
a large pool of potential litigants for test cases. Second, since North
28. PRINCIOTTA, BIELICK, & CHAPMAN, supra note 21, at 13,
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006042.pdf ("Number and percentage of homeschooled students
whose parents reported particular reasons for homeschooling as being applicable to their situation
and as being their most important reason for homeschooling: 2003"). 31.2% of students were
members of a family which reported that their "most important reason" for homeschooling was
"[c]oncern about environment of other schools." Id. 29.8% of students were members of a family
which reported that their "most important reason" for homeschooling was "[t]o provide religious or
moral instruction." Id. 16.5% of students were members of a family which reported that their "most
important reason" for homeschooling was "[d]issatisfaction with academic instruction at other
schools." Id. 8.8% of students were members of a family which reported that their "most important
reason" for homeschooling was "[o]ther reasons" than those listed, including the following: "It was
the child's choice; to allow parents more control over what child was leaming; and flexibility." Id.
7.2% of students were members of a family which reported that their "most important reason" for
homeschooling was that their "[c]hild has other special needs." Id. And finally, 6.5% of students
were members of a family which reported that their "most important reason" for homeschooling was
that their "[c]hild has a physical or mental health problem." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Compare North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Non-Public & Public School
Enrollment Comparisons 2004-2005, http://www.ncdnpe.org/hhh5l0p.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2006), with North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Non-Public & Public School
Enrollment Comparisons 1973-1974, http://www.ncdnpe.orgfhhh5l0a.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2006).
32. North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Non-Public & Public School Enrollment
Comparisons 1973-1974, http://www.ncdnpe.org/hhh5l0a.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
33. Id.
34. Id. See Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646-47 (N.C. 1985) (homeschooling was illegal in
North Carolina prior to the Delconte court's holding that the state statutory scheme did not prohibit
home instruction; the issue of whether the North Carolina General Assembly could validly prohibit
homeschooling under the state constitution was not resolved). The North Carolina General
Assembly went on to explicitly permit homeschooling by state statute, so the issue of whether
homeschooling can be constitutionally prohibited is currently moot. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 11 5C-
563 to -565.
35. North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Non-Public & Public School Enrollment
Comparisons 2004-2005, supra note 31.
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Carolinians elect their state judges, this interest group has a recurring
opportunity to hold these judges politically accountable for unfavorable
decisions.36
Further, the North Carolina judicial system is ideal for testing a
state constitutional or statutory right to education, because state court
procedural law provides for many opportunities to appeal an unfavorable
decision. An educational rights case would originate at the trial court
level in District or Superior Court.37 In the event of an unfavorable
decision, the litigants would have a mandatory right of appeal to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, 38 where a three-judge panel would
review the trial court decision. 39 If one member of the three-judge panel
dissents (or a substantial question arising under the federal or state
constitution is involved), then the losing litigants would have a
mandatory right of appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court.40  Even
if the decision of the three-judge panel is unanimous, the Supreme Court
still has discretion to take the case on appeal. 4  Thus, in addition to
being the home of a powerful interest group that would benefit from
school policy reform, North Carolina provides a very accessible appellate
system.42
Finally, the public schools in North Carolina have no satisfactory
legal justification for excluding private and homeschool students from
participating in public school programs on a part-time basis. Some
scholars suggest that public schools fear competition from their
nonpublic counterparts, and thus, want to discourage the continuing rise
in the number of private and homeschool students.43  Obviously, the fear
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10(a) (2007) ("The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice
and six associate justices, elected by the qualified voters of the State for terms of eight years."); §
7A- 16 ("The Court of Appeals... shall consist initially of six judges, elected by the qualified voters
of the State for terms of eight years."); § 7A-41.2 ("Candidates for the office of regular superior
court judge shall be both nominated and elected by the qualified voters of the superior court district
for which the election is sought."); § 7A- 140 ("Each district judge shall be elected by the qualified
voters of the district court district in which he or she is to serve at the time of the election for
members of the General Assembly.").
37. § 7A-240 ("Except for the original jurisdiction in respect of claims against the State which is
vested in the Supreme Court, original general jurisdiction of all justiciable matters of a civil nature
cognizable in the General Court of Justice is vested in the aggregate in the superior court division
and the district court division as the trial divisions of the General Court of Justice. Except in respect
of proceedings in probate and the administration of decedents' estates, the original civil jurisdiction
so vested in the trial divisions is vested concurrently in each division.").
38. §§ 7A-27(b)-(c) (An "appeal lies of right to Court of Appeals" from most final judgments of
a superior court and any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.).
39. § 7A-16 ("The Court of Appeals shall sit in panels of three judges each,").
40. § 7A-30 ("[A]n appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court from any decision of the Court of
Appeals rendered in a case" that "directly involves a substantial question arising under the
Constitution of the United States or of this State" or "[i]n which there is a dissent.").
41. § 7A-26 ("The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals respectively have jurisdiction to
review upon appeal decisions of the several courts of the General Court of Justice and of
administrative agencies, upon matters of law or legal inference, in accordance with the system of
appeals provided in this Article.").
42. See id.
43. See Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy
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of competition, by itself, does not justify the exclusion of these
children. 4
Nor can it be argued that private and homeschool students are free
riders. In the 2003-2004 school term, North Carolina spent nearly $9.18
billion on operating its public school system. 45 On average, each child in
the system was allocated $7,000 during the same period.46 Private and
homeschool families pay the same proportion of these expenditures in
taxes as their similarly situated public school counterparts.47
Since private and homeschool families pay the same taxes in
support of public schools as their similarly situated counterparts in the
public school system and they only want to participate in a few of the
offered programs. It stands to reason that these families still contribute
far more resources to the system than they would consume. Thus, from
an economic standpoint, the exclusion of private and homeschool
students from public school programs represents a growing inequity in
the law that should be addressed.
Fortunately, there is a strong legal argument that this exclusion is
not only inequitable, but impermissible under the constitutional and
statutory schemes in North Carolina. Though not every court is prepared
to enforce or expand existing educational rights, the seminal case of
Leandro v. State48 demonstrates the willingness of the North Carolina
Supreme Court to (1) find educational rights in the state constitution and
statutes 49 and (2) enforce these rights, even at considerable expense to
the State. 50
of Religious Bigotry By Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 425 n.82
(2003) (arguing the "real, unstated goal" of public school interests that oppose nonpublic education
is "to preserve a public school monopoly that is threatened by competition from all private schools,
religious and non-religious"); Denise C. Morgan, The Devil is in the Details. Or, Why I Haven 't Yet
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Vouchers, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 477, 492 (2003)
("[O]pponents of vouchers [i.e., market competition] imagine that vouchers will result in the demise
of public schools.").
44. See Douglas A. Edwards, Cleveland and Milwaukee's Free Market Solution for the "Pedantic
Heaps of Sophistry and Nonsense" That Plague Public Education: Mistakes on Two Lakes?, 30
AKRON L. REv. 687, 692 (1997) ("Growing numbers support competition between private and
public schools.").
45. North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, North Carolina Public Schools Statistical
Profile 2005 50,
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/resources/data/statisticalprofile/2005profile.pdf (last
visited Nov. 5, 2006).
46. Id.
47. There is no deduction, credit, exemption, or exclusion under North Carolina law to lessen the
tax burden for families that educate their children outside of the public school system.
48. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
49. Id. at 259-60 (finding that various provisions of the state constitution, and possibly, state
statutes as well, "combine to guarantee every child of [North Carolina] an opportunity to receive a
sound basic education in [North Carolina] public schools").
50. See id. at 354-55 (remanding case to superior court for proceedings consistent with the
holding that North Carolinians have a state constitutional right to a "sound basic education"); Hoke
County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 372-373 (N.C. 2004) (affirming superior court order
that North Carolina must "remedy constitutional deficiencies relating to the public school
education"); see Robert H. Tiller, Equitable and Adequate School Funding-Practice
2007]
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This article argues that private and homeschool students in North
Carolina have a state constitutional and statutory right to participate in
public school programs on a part-time basis. This right is based on the
North Carolina Constitution's explicit acknowledgment of nonpublic
education and guarantees of equal protection and equal access to public
schools. This right is also based on state statutes that mirror the wording
and spirit of the state constitution's guarantees. Since the North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that equal access to public schools is a
fundamental right under the state constitution, this right can only be
restricted by a statute or regulation that can survive a strict scrutiny
review.
In Part II, this article discusses the law of nonpublic schools and
educational rights in North Carolina and how the Leandro case affects
those laws and rights. Part III outlines how the exclusion of private and
homeschool students from public school programs violates the North
Carolina Constitution's dual promises of equal protection and equal
access to public schools.
II. EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS
IN NORTH CAROLINA
In line with every state in the nation, North Carolina's
"constitution addresses the [General Assembly's] responsibility to
provide for a public school system.",51 However, this responsibility is
not merely aspirational in the Tar Heel State-it has bite.5  The North
Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution to grant
substantive rights to students and to impose substantial legal
requirements on the public school system. 53
Perspectives: Litigating Educational Adequacy in North Carolina: A Personal Account of Leandro
v. State, 83 NEB. L. REV. 893, 899 (2005) ("During the course of proceedings from 1994 to late
2002, the State increased its program of supplemental funding for low-wealth schools. This program
received approximately $18.2 million in 1994. In 2001, the program received $85 million. The low-
wealth money in Hoke County has paid for teachers, books and equipment that were badly needed,
although it has not come close to meeting all the important needs. It is widely thought that the
increases in state funding for this program were in large part the result of the Leandro case.").
51. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 10, at 64 n.5.
52. See Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980) (holding that "equal
access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state
constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process."); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at
259 (holding that "the North Carolina Constitution does guarantee every child of the state the
opportunity to receive a 'sound basic education'); Hoke County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 372-73
(affirming superior court order that state must "remedy constitutional deficiencies relating to the
public school education").
53. Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 113; Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 259; Hoke County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d
at 372-73.
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A. The Law of Nonpublic Schools in North Carolina
"The North Carolina Constitution requires the General Assembly
to permit children of this state to be 'educated by other means' than in
the public schools. 54  This requirement would seem to necessitate a
legal alternative to public school, and raises the question of whether the
North Carolina General Assembly can validly prohibit certain types of
nonpublic schools under the state constitution.55 However, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has refrained from 5 iving a strict definition of
what "other means" may legally constitute. In Delconte v. State, the
court simply held that homeschools are not outlawed by the state
statutory scheme without reaching the issue of whether they could be
constitutionally prohibited.5 7 However, this issue of constitutional
prohibition is largely moot for private schools and homeschools, which
58
are both currently permitted by state statute.
Though nonpublic schools are legal in North Carolina, and this
legal status is afforded some level of protection under the state
constitution, students who attend these types of schools are currently
prohibited from participating in public school athletics, 59 and have no
absolute right to participate in any public school programs.
54. Delconte v. State, 329 S.E.2d 636, 646 (N.C. 1985). See also N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 3 ("The
General Assembly shall provide that every child of appropriate age and of sufficient mental and
physical ability shall attend the public schools, unless educated by other means.").
55. Delconte, 329 S.E.2d at 646-7 ("Finally, it is clear that if we interpreted our present school
attendance statutes to preclude home instruction, serious constitutional questions would arise. ""The
North Carolina Constitution requires the General Assembly to permit children of this state to be
"educated by other means" than in the public schools. Whether these "other means" would include
home instruction is a serious question which we need not, because of our resolution of the case, now
address. It is clear that the North Carolina Constitution empowers the General Assembly to require
that our children be educated. Whether the constitution permits the General Assembly to prohibit
their education at home is not so clear.").
56. Id. at 648. The court refrained from giving a strict definition of what "other means" may
legally constitute, and instead held that: "Whether home instruction ought to be permitted, and if so,
the extent to which it should be regulated, are questions of public policy which are reasonably
debatable. Our legislature may want to consider them and speak plainly about them. It may
determine to continue to permit home instruction relatively unregulated or to prohibit home
instruction altogether. On the other hand, the legislature may determine to permit home instruction
provided it meets certain minimum, objectively determinable standards relating to curricula, teacher
qualifications, testing, scheduling, etc., in addition to those already provided. Whatever the
legislature ultimately decides to do, we are satisfied that it would not be appropriate for us to
determine whether home instruction may be constitutionally prohibited, or the extent to which it may
be constitutionally regulated until the legislature has determined as a matter of public policy to
prohibit it or to regulate it more closely than it now does." Id.
57. Id.
58. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554 (2007) (state statutes permitting and regulating
private schools); §§ II 5C-563 to -565 (state statutes permitting and regulating homeschools).
59. Batista & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 243.
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1. Athletics
In North Carolina, the State Board of Education (the "Board") has
the authority to "adopt rules governing interscholastic athletic activities
conducted by local boards of education, including eligibility for student
participation., 60 The Board is also statutorily empowered to "authorize a
designated organization to apply and enforce the Board's rules.' Using
this power, the Board has authorized the North Carolina High School
Athletic Association (the "NCHSAA") to regulate public school
athletics. 62 The NCHSAA's eligibility rules require that
[a] student must, at the time of any game in which he or she
participates, be a regularly enrolled member of the school's
student body, according to local policy. If there is no local
policy, "regularly enrolled" is defined as enrolled for at least
one half of the "minimum load." It is recommended the
student be in school the day of the contest.
63
Private and homeschool students, who have their own curricula
and course loads, are generally unable to meet this requirement of regular
enrollment. 64 As such, in North Carolina, the students of nonpublic
schools are effectively banned from participating in public school
athletics. 65
2. Core Classes
No state statute directly addresses the question of whether private
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-12(23).
61. Id.
62. 16 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 6E.0202 (2007).
63. North Carolina High School Athletic Association, 2005-2006 NCHSAA Handbook,
Combined Rules and Regulations, Eligibility 109, http://www.nchsaa.org/pdf/3766A.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2006).
64. Batista & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 243. The General Assembly has delegated its authority to
adopt eligibility rules for participation in public school programs, and the state governmental
organizations to which this authority has been delegated have effectively banned nonpublic students:
"The North Carolina legislature has authorized the State Board of Education to adopt rules
governing interscholastic activities, or designate an organization to do so. As a result, the Board of
Education has authorized the North Carolina High School Athletic Association (NCHSAA) to
regulate interscholastic activities in North Carolina. NCHSAA eligibility rules require that a student
must be a regularly enrolled member of the school's student body, must be in regular attendance for
the present semester in order to be eligible for interscholastic competition, and must participate for
the school to which the local board of education has assigned him/her based on his/her place of
residence." Id.
65. Id.
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school students may take core classes 66 in public school. Thus, local
school officials get to decide whether private school students are eligible
for these classes. 67  It is also true that "[n]o North Carolina statute
directly defines guidelines to govern the possibility of part-time
admission of home-schooled students into public school classes."
68
However, the North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education (the
"NCDNPE") has interpreted section 115C-563(a) of the North Carolina
General Statutes 69 to prohibit homeschool students from taking core
classes in public school. 70  The statute provides, in relevant part, that:
"'Home school' means a nonpublic school in which one or more children
of not more than two families or households receive academic instruction
from parents or legal guardians, or a member of either household."'
'
The NCDNPE holds that this legal definition requires that only (1)
parents, (2) legal guardians, or (3) members of a homeschooling
household are permitted to give academic instruction (i.e., teach core
classes) to their homeschool students.72
Thus, the NCDNPE asserts that allowing a homeschool student to
take a core class from someone else, like a public school teacher, would
violate his or her homeschool's status as a legal educational entity under
North Carolina law.7 3 This restriction applies to those between the ages
66. Core classes are classes in "language arts, math, science and social studies." North Carolina
Division of Non-Public Education, Frequently Asked Home School Question Topics, supra note 5.
67. Id.
68. Lukasik, supra note 5, at 1977 n.368. No state statute directly addresses the question of
whether homeschool students may participate in public school programs on a part-time basis: "In
other states, where no statute or regulation mandates that public school officials maintain
discretionary control over part-time enrollment of home-schooled children, state law suggests that
such a policy should be the rule. Consider North Carolina, for example. Recognizing that public
schools are not required under either the state constitution or the state statutes to accept home-
schooled students on a part-time basis does not mean that public schools are prohibited from
accepting those home-schooled students in particular circumstances .... No North Carolina statute
directly defines guidelines to govern the possibility of part-time admission of home-schooled
students into public school classes. However, according to North Carolina General Statute II 5C-40,
'local boards of education ... shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to
the public schools in their administrative units.' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-40 (1994). Therefore, 'in
the absence of any statute or regulation to the contrary, the authority to determine questions
regarding the public schools generally rests with local boards of education.' 57 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen.
26 (1987) (stating that it is within the discretionary power of local boards of education to release
public school students for part-time attendance at private (not home) schools). Given the absence of
other statutory direction, 115C-40 gives local boards in North Carolina discretion to accept or deny
part-time admission to home-schooled students. This conclusion regarding home and public school
integration in North Carolina is consistent with the state's opinion regarding the integration of public
and private schools. The North Carolina Attorney General determined that the authority of the local
board of education included 'the power to permit or refuse the release of students to private schools
for part of the school day.' 57 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. at 26." Id.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-563(a) (2007).
70. North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Frequently Asked Home School Question
Topics, supra note 5.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-563(a).
72. North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Frequently Asked Home School Question
Topics, supra note 5.
73. Id.
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of seven and sixteen years old.74  As such, homeschool students are not
permitted to take core classes in public school.75
3. Noncore Classes
No state statute directly addresses the question of whether private
school students may take non-core classes in public school. Local school
officials get to decide whether private school students are eligible for
these classes.76  The same is true for homeschool students, and the
NCDNPE does not assert that allowing a homeschool student to take a
non-core class would violate his or her homeschool's status as a legal
educational entity.77  Local school officials also get to decide whether
homeschool students are eligible for these classes. 78
B. North Carolina Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Education
North Carolina has several educational rights provisions in its state
constitution and statutes. 79 These provisions have bite-state appellate
courts have shown a willingness to find and enforce substantive
educational rights under the North Carolina Constitution and statutes. 80
In addition to providing parents the right to educate their children in a
nonpublic school, the North Carolina Constitution guarantees a
fundamental right of equal access to participation in the public school
system 8 and a fundamental right to a "sound basic education."
82
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.C. CONST. art. IX; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C.
80. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997) (remanding case to superior court for
proceedings consistent with the holding that North Carolinians have a state constitutional right to a
"sound basic education"); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 372-73 (N.C. 2004)
(affirming in part superior court order that North Carolina must "remedy constitutional deficiencies
relating to the public school education").
81. Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980) ("[E]qual access to
participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution
and protected by considerations of procedural due process.").
82. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255 ("Article 1, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North
Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a
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1. Sneed: Fundamental Right of Equal Access to Participation
in the Public School System
"[E]qual access to participation in our public school systeri is a
fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by
considerations of procedural due process." 83 Article IX, section 2(1) of
the North Carolina Constitution provides that "[t]he General Assembly
shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system
of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in
every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students." 84 Article I, section 15 provides that "[t]he people have a right
to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and
maintain that right.",85 In Sneed v. Greensboro Board of Education, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that together, these two state
constitutional provisions elevate the right of equal access to fundamental
status.8 6 Notably, the court also cited a since repealed state statute to
assert that the North Carolina General Assembly recognized the "force of
these constitutional provisions. 87
Equal access to public schools is a fundamental right in North
Carolina has not garnered much attention from legal scholars.
88
However, in Britt v. North Carolina State Board of Education, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals cited Sneed and reiterated its guarantee: "The
fundamental right that is guaranteed by our Constitution, then, is to equal
access to our public schools-that is, every child has a fundamental right
to receive an education in our public schools., 89 The Britt court added
bite to this guarantee, holding the State of North Carolina responsible
"for overseeing [its] public schools ... to ensure that every student in the
State receives the education to which he or she is entitled." 90 Thus, in
North Carolina, there is a fundamental right of equal access to public
sound basic education in our public schools.").
83. Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 113.
84. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
85. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
86. Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 113. The court held that: "Article IX, Section 2(1) of our constitution
guarantees a uniform public school system 'wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students.' Additionally, Article 1, Section 15 provides that '[t]he people have a right to the privilege
of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.' . . . It is clear, then, that
equal access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our
state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process." Id.
87. Id.
88. To date, no law review article or student note that is published on LexisNexis is solely
devoted to analyzing Sneed's seminal mandate that equal access to public schools is a fundamental
fight in North Carolina.
89. Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
90. Id.
2007]
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schools, and the State is responsible for ensuring this right is
vindicated. 91
2. Equal Protection under the North Carolina Constitution
"[T]he principle of the equal protection of the law, made explicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, was
also inherent in the Constitution of [North Carolina]" prior to the
adoption of the current article I, section 19.92 Post-adoption, this
principle of equal protection is also explicit 93 in the North Carolina
Constitution, which guarantees that "[n]o person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to
discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national
origin."
94
Furthermore, in North Carolina, state courts use the same test as
federal courts when "applying the equal protection clause of the state and
federal constitutions to challenged classifications. 9 5  In line with the
federal test, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that "[a] claim
that legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause is to be evaluated
under one of two levels of review."
96
First, strict scrutiny review is "required when the challenged
legislation [or regulation] impacts upon a 'suspect class' or a
'fundamental right."' 97  This high level of review "requires the
government to demonstrate that the classification is necessary to promote
a compelling governmental interest. ' 98 "[A] challenged governmental
action is unconstitutional if the State cannot establish that it is narrowly
tailored" to promote that interest.99 In sum, strict scrutiny "demand[s]
searching judicial inquiry to ensure that the regulatory means chosen by
government promote the public ends sought without needless
overinclusion or suspicious underinclusion, thereby favoring the use of
the least restrictive alternative."' 100  Notably, education is not a
91. Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 113; Britt, 357 S.E.2d at 436.
92. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (N.C. 1971).
93. Id. (holding that the principle of equal protection had been "expressly incorporated in Art. I, §
19, of the Constitution of North Carolina, effective 1 July 1971").
94. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
95. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (N.C.
1994) (quoting Duggins v. N.C. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountant Exam'rs, 240 S.E.2d 406,
413 (N.C. 1978)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Texfi Indus., Inc. v. Fayetteville, 269 S.E. 2d 142, 149 (N.C. 1980)).
99. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (N.C. 2002).
100. Louis D. Bilionis, Liberty, The "Law of the Land, " and Abortion in North Carolina, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 1839, 1850 (1993).
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"fundamental right" under the federal constitution.10' However, equal
access to public schools is a fundamental right under the North Carolina
Constitution. 102 Therefore, legislation or regulations that impact this
right of equal access would have to survive strict scrutiny review to be
constitutional in North Carolina.
Second, rational basis review "is used when the legislation [or
regulation] at issue does not impact upon a suspect class or a
fundamental right." 10 3  This lower level of review "involves a
determination of whether the 'challenged classification bears any
reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute,"' 104 and if it does "it
will not be set aside merely because it results in some inequalities in
practice."' 105  Though most lawsuits for equal access to public school
programs fail when judged under rational basis review, 106 it is possible to
win, even under this lower standard. 107 However, an educational rights
case that is based on equal protection is far more likely to succeed under
strict scrutiny review.
3. Leandro: Fundamental Right to a Sound Basic Education
and a Revivification of State-level, Educational Rights in North
Carolina
Leandro did "not involve issues of equal access to available
educational opportunities."' 1 8  However, Leandro is relevant to a
discussion on whether an equal access case would succeed in North
Carolina, because its seminal and far-reaching holding demonstrates a
willingness on the part of the North Carolina Supreme Court to find and
enforce educational rights in the state constitution, even at considerable
expense to the State. 109 In the words of former Justice Robert Orr, a co-
101. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) ("Nor is education a fundamental right .... ).
102. Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980) ("[E]qual access to
participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution
and protected by considerations of procedural due process.").
103. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (N.C.
1994).
104. Id. (quoting Duggins v. N.C. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountant Exam'rs, 240 S.E.2d
406, 413 (N.C. 1978)) (emphasis in original).
105. Duggins, 240 S.E.2d at 413.
106. See Grob, supra note 7, at 831-36 (discussing various cases where rational basis review was
applied to First and Fourteenth Amendment claims and the parents subsequently lost).
107. See Davis v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 375 (Mass. Super. Ct.
1995) (holding that excluding a nonpublic student from a public school sports team violated equal
protection under rational basis review).
108. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997).
109. See id. at 254-59 (finding that various provisions of the state constitution and possibly state
statutes "combine to guarantee every child of [North Carolina] an opportunity to receive a sound
basic education in [North Carolina] public schools").
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author of Leandro,
The NC Supreme Court has strongly reaffirmed the state's
long standing constitutional commitment to public education
in the Leandro and Hoke County decisions. This
constitutional right of the opportunity for a sound basic
education extends to all our children regardless of age or
circumstance. It will be vigorously enforced by the courts
and the legislative and executive branches will be expected to
adequately comply with that right regardless of the cost or
inconvenience to the government. 110
a. Plaintiffs' Case
The plaintiffs in Leandro were a group of public school students
and their guardians, who alleged that North Carolina's funding system
for public schools violated the state constitution.' 1 ' Specifically, the
plaintiffs argued that they were constitutionally entitled to (1) "adequate
educational opportunities," and (2) "equal educational opportunities." 112
First, the plaintiffs alleged that "children in their poor school
districts are not receiving a sufficient education to meet the minimal
standard for a constitutionally adequate education.""' 3  As proof, they
listed how the schools in poor districts were deficient. 114 According to
the plaintiffs, their schools had poor test scores and "inadequate"
facilities, local salary supplements for teachers, book collections, and
technology. "15
Second, the plaintiffs asserted that "children in their districts are
denied an equal education because there is a great disparity between the
educational opportunities available to children in their districts and those
offered in more wealthy districts of [the] state." ' 1 6  The plaintiffs
contended that "North Carolina's system of school funding, based in part
on funding by the county in which the district is located, necessarily
denies the students in ... relatively poor school districts educational
opportunities equal to those available in relatively wealthy districts.
' '1 7
This disparity in local funding, they argued, is impermissible under the
110. E-mail from former Justice Robert Orr of the North Carolina Supreme Court, Executive
Director and Senior Counsel, North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law, to John T. Plecnik,
Associate, Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP (October 9, 2006, 17:28:20 EST) (on file with author).
111. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 251-52.
112. Id. at 252.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 252-53.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 252.
117. Id. at 256.
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state constitution. 118
b. Fundamental Right to Sound Basic Education
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs that
children in North Carolina are entitled to adequate educational
opportunities, but disagreed that these opportunities need to be equal. 1 19
The court concluded "that Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2
of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of
this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in [public
school]." 120 It based this conclusion on the finding that "at the time
[article IX, section 2(1)] was originally written in 1868 providing for a
'general and uniform' system [of public schools]... the intent of the
framers was that every child have a fundamental right to a sound basic
education." 
121
What is the qualitative content, if any, of this fundamental right to
a sound basic education? The court purported to acknowledge that "the
legislative process provides a better forum than the [judiciary] for
discussing and determining" what constitutes a "sound basic
education."'' 2 2 However, it held that "[e]ducational goals and standards
adopted by the legislature" are merely "factors which may be
considered."' 123 They are not determinative on the issue of whether an
education is constitutionally adequate. 124 Instead, the court provided its
own definition of what constitutes a "sound basic education" under the
state constitution:
For purposes of our Constitution, a "sound basic education"
is one that will provide the student with at least: (1) sufficient
ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a
sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and
physical science to enable the student to function in a
complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic
economic and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices with regard to issues that affect the student
personally or affect the student's community, state, and
nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable
118. Id. at 252.
119. Id. at 257.
120. Id. at 255.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 259.
123. Id.
124. Id.
2007]
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the student to successfully engage in post-secondary
education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic
and vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an
equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful
employment in contemporary society. 1
25
As such, the plaintiffs' first argument was successful. There is a
fundamental right to a sound basic education in North Carolina, and that
right has a qualitative content that is enforceable in court. 
126
However, only Justice Robert Orr, in partial dissent, agreed that
the plaintiffs had a right to equal educational opportunities that was
violated by the disparity in local funding. 127  The North Carolina
Supreme Court pointed to article IX, section 2(2)128 in determining that
no right to equal opportunities had been violated:
Because the North Carolina Constitution expressly states that
units of local governments with financial responsibility for
public education may provide additional funding to
supplement the educational programs provided by the state,
there can be nothing unconstitutional about their doing so or
in any inequality of opportunity occurring as a result. 129
Thus, the plaintiffs' second argument was unsuccessful. "[T]he
equal opportunities clause of Article IX, Section 2(1) does not require
substantially equal funding or educational advantages in all school
districts." 130
c. State Statutes Show Legislative Intent to Enforce
Educational Rights
The plaintiffs also cited four state statutes as support for their
125. Id. at 255.
126. Id. at 259 ("We have concluded that some of the allegations in the complaints of plaintiff-
parties state claims upon which relief may be granted if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, we must remand this case to the trial court to permit plaintiff-parties to proceed on those
claims.").
127. Id. at 261 (Orr, J., dissenting) ("I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that holds
that the alleged disparity in the educational opportunities offered by different school districts in this
state does not violate Article IX, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution. I believe ... that
if the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint are proven at trial, then the state's funding plan for public
education would violate the 'equal opportunities' clause set forth in our Constitution.").
128. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) ("The General Assembly may assign to units of local
government such responsibility for the financial support of the free public schools as it may deem
appropriate. The governing boards of units of local government with financial responsibility for
public education may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-
secondary school program.").
129. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 256.
130. Id.
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claims:
Specifically, plaintiff-parties allege in their complaints that
the education system of North Carolina as currently
maintained and operated violates the following requirements
of chapter 1 15C: (1) that part of N.C.G.S. § 1 15C-1 requiring
a "general and uniform system of free public schools...
throughout the State, where an equal opportunity shall be
provided for all students"; (2) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-
81 (a l) requiring that the state provide "every student in the
State equal access to a Basic Education Program"; (3)
that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-122(3) requiring the state to
"prevent denial of equal educational... opportunity on the
basis of ... economic status ... in the provision of services
to any child"; and (4) that part of N.C.G.S. § 115C-408(b)
requiring that the state "assure that the necessary resources
are provided. .. from State revenue sources [for] the
instructional expenses for current operations of the public
school system as defined in the standard course of study."' 131
Though the North Carolina Supreme Court held that none of these
statutes was a basis for an argument that a disparity in local funding is
impermissible, it recognized that they might "reiterate the constitutional
requirement that every child in the state have equal access to a sound
basic education.' ' 32  This provides a state statutory, as well as a
constitutional, basis for the plaintiffs to recover. 133 As in Sneed, these
statutes are evidence that the North Carolina General Assembly has
recognized the force of the educational rights provisions in the state
constitution. 134
This part of the holding is potentially beneficial to private and
homeschool families that want to defend their children's right to
participate in public school programs on a part-time basis. Section
115C-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes is practically a
codification of article IX, section 2(1)' 3 -the constitutional provision
131. Id. at 258-59.
132. Id. at 259.
133. Id. ("To the extent that plaintiff-parties can produce evidence tending to show that
defendants have committed the violations of chapter 11 5C alleged in the complaints and that those
violations have deprived children of some districts of the opportunity to receive a sound basic
education, plaintiff-parties are entitled to do so.").
134. Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980) ("The force of these
constitutional provisions is recognized in the declared policy of this state 'to ensure every child a fair
and full opportunity to reach his full potential."').
135. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11 5C-1 (2007) ("A general and uniform system of free public
schools shall be provided throughout the State, wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Constitution of North Carolina.
Tuition shall be free of charge to all children of the State, and to every person of the State less than
21 years old, who has not completed a standard high school course of study. There shall be operated
in every local school administrative unit a uniform school term of nine months, without the levy of a
2007]
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that also supports the fundamental right of equal access to public
schools. 136 Thus, private and homeschool families actually have two
possible legal foundations for their case: the state constitution and state
statutes. Further, if an argument were made that recognizing equal
access by court decree is judicial activism, and that such a significant
change in the law should only come from the legislative branch, then the
plaintiffs could counter that the North Carolina General Assembly has
already recognized the force of their argument by statute.
d. Revivification of State-level Educational Rights
Leandro revivified and reaffirmed state-level educational rights in
North Carolina. Specifically, Leandro found the fundamental right to a
sound basic education in the text of article I, section 15 and article IX,
section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution, the same two provisions
that support the fundamental right of equal access to public schools. 137
This opens the door for private and homeschool families to argue that
their children's fundamental right of equal access has been burdened by
the rules and interpretations that exclude them from participating in
public school programs on a part-time basis. Therefore, private and
homeschool families can argue that these exclusionary rules violate equal
protection under the North Carolina Constitution.
Fundamentally, Leandro was a seminal decision that demonstrates
the willingness of the North Carolina Supreme Court to find and enforce
educational rights in the state constitution, 38 even at considerable
expense to the State.' 39 The decision in Leandro is not directly on point
as to the question of whether private and homeschool families have a
right to participate in public school programs on a part-time basis.
40
However, the court based its decision-that children have a fundamental
right to a sound basic education-on the same constitutional provisions
that support the Sneed court's holding that children have a fundamental
State ad valorem tax therefor.") with N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) ("The General Assembly shall
provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which
shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be
provided for all students.").
136. Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 113.
137. Id; see also Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
138. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254-59 (holding that various provisions of the state constitution and
possibly state statutes "combine to guarantee every child of [North Carolina] an opportunity to
receive a sound basic education in [North Carolina] public schools").
139. See id. at 259 (remanding case to superior court for proceedings consistent with the holding
that North Carolinians have a state constitutional right to a "sound basic education"); Hoke County
Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 372-73 (N.C. 2004) (affirming superior court order that North
Carolina must "remedy constitutional deficiencies relating to the public school education"); Tiller,
supra note 50, at 899.
140. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254 ("The present case does not involve issues of equal access to
available educational opportunities .... ").
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right of equal access to public schools. 141 This alone strongly suggests
that Sneed is still good law and that its holding will be rigorously
enforced. 1
42
The decision to recognize a state-level right to a sound basic
education was more groundbreaking, and more costly, than simply
allowing nonpublic students to participate in a few public school classes
and sports. Leandro has already cost North Carolina tens of millions of
dollars.143 By comparison, recognizing the right of nonpublic students to
participate in public school programs almost seems like a modest reform.
Thus, Leandro can be seen as more than just a guarantee that students
have a fundamental right to a sound basic education. It can be
interpreted as a statement by the North Carolina Supreme Court that it
will enforce the educational rights provisions in the state constitution,
even at great cost. 144 Therefore, it can be seen as a reaffirmation and
revivification of state-level educational rights. 1
45
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY RIGHTS To PARTICIPATE
IN PUBLIC SCHOOL PROGRAMS ON A PART-TIME BASIS
A. Equal Protection: State Constitutional Right to Participate in
Public School Programs
North Carolina law classifies students into two groups: public and
nonpublic students. Public school students are granted a sound basic
education by the state, 146 and the state has recognized an enforceable
right to this free education.147  However, private and homeschool
students are classified as nonpublic students and are treated very
differently from public school students. All nonpublic students are
excluded from public school athletics. 148 Homeschool students are also
excluded from taking core classes in public school. 149  In all other
instances, a nonpublic student's access to public school programs is
within the sole discretion of local school officials. Therefore, nonpublic
141. Compare Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254, with Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d
106, 113 (N.C. 1980).
142. See Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 113.
143. See Tiller, supra note 50, at 899.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997).
147. Id.
148. Batista & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 243.
149. North Carolina Division of Non-Public Education, Frequently Asked Home School Question
Topics, supra note 5.
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students currently have no absolute right to participate in any public
school program.' 50 At best, they can ask their local school board for a
favor. 151
1. Is the Fundamental Right of Equal Access to the Public
Schools Implicated?
"[E]qual access to participation in our public school system is a
fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution." 152 Specifically,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that article I, section 15 and
article IX, section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution combine to
give children in the state a fundamental right of equal access to public
schools.153 Neither constitutional provision requires that a child must be
a full-time public school student to exercise this right, nor does any state
statute. 154 The state constitutional and statutory scheme in North
Carolina seems analogous to the situation in Snyder v. Charlotte Public
School District, where the Michigan Supreme Court held that nonpublic
students are entitled to participate in some public school programs on a
part-time basis in the absence of an explicit full-time attendance
requirement. 1
55
However, some negative precedent should be noted: the Snyder
court did not extend this right of equal access to all public school
programs. 5 6 Rather, it held that nonpublic students are prohibited from
taking core classes, using largely the same rationale the NCDNPE posits
for excluding homeschool students from core classes in North Carolina:
However, not every class offered by a public school must be
made available on a shared time basis. In order to meet the
compulsory attendance laws, a nonpublic school child must
attend "a state approved nonpublic school, which teaches
subjects comparable to those taught in the public schools to
children of corresponding age and grade. . . ." MCL
380.1561(3)(a); MSA 15.41561(3)(a). This implies that the
nonpublic school must provide a "core curriculum" for its
students, such as basic reading, mathematics, writing,
English, etc. If shared time instruction were required for all
courses, it would be possible for a nonpublic school to offer a
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980).
153. Id.
154. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.C. GEN. STAT, § 115C-1 (2007).
155. Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d 151, 158-59 (Mich. 1984).
156. Id. at 161-62.
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full curriculum to its students while conducting only a small
percentage of the classes at the nonpublic school. This would
thwart the Legislature's requirement that nonpublic and
public schools offer comparable basic education to their
respective students.1
57
Furthermore, in a later decision that has not been reviewed by the
Michigan Supreme Court, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
participating in extracurricular activities, like athletics, is legally distinct
from participating in public school classes. 158 Participating in athletics is
a privilege, not a right. 159 Thus, nonpublic students can be excluded
from public school athletics in Michigan. 
1 60
Finally, in Thomas v. Allegany County Board of Education, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was presented with a case that was
legally and factually analogous to Snyder, where a state statute purported
to grant a right of equal access to public school programs to all children,
without mentioning a full-time attendance requirement.1 61 According to
the Thomas court, the families of nonpublic students argued that their
children "are entitled not merely to be admitted to the public schools of
this state, but to any part or portion of the public school system which
they choose." 162 This argument failed, and the Thomas court held that it
could not "adopt such a strained construction."' 
63
However, this article argues that Snyder provides a more rational
principle of construction for educational rights provisions 164 than
Thomas, which reads an additional requirement of full-time attendance
into a statute that, on its face, does not distinguish between full and part-
time students. 165 Furthermore, this article argues that North Carolina's
educational rights scheme is stronger than Michigan's because the North
Carolina Supreme Court must interpret its state constitution and statutes,
whereas the Snyder court was only basing its holding in favor of equal
access on a statutory provision.166 As such, it would be reasonable to
assert that nonpublic students in North Carolina have a more robust right
of equal access to public schools. Hence, there is a stronger argument
157. Id.
158. Reid v. Kenowa Hills Pub. Sch., 680 N.W.2d 62, 66-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
159. Id. at 68 ("[O]ur courts have also held that participation in interscholastic sports is a
privilege, not a right.").
160. Id. (holding "that Michigan statutes do not require public schools to admit homeschooled
students to their athletic programs and that plaintiffs do not have a statutory right to participate in
extracurricular interscholastic athletic events").
161. Thomas v. Allegany County Bd. of Educ., 443 A.2d 622, 627 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d 151, 158-59 (Mich. 1984) (granting
nonpublic students access to some public school programs on the basis of an equal access statute).
165. Thomas, 443 A.2d at 627 (denying nonpublic students access to public school programs
despite an equal access statute).
166. Snyder, 365 N.W.2d at 158-59 (basing decision to grant equal access on state statute).
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that they should be entitled to participate in core classes, athletics, and
noncore classes.
Thus, there is a strong argument under the state constitution that
when nonpublic students in North Carolina are excluded from
participating in public school programs on a part-time basis, their
fundamental right of equal access is implicated. Since a fundamental
right is implicated, their classification and exclusion should be reviewed
under strict scrutiny. 1
67
2. Do the Rules and Interpretations That Exclude Nonpublic
Students Burden Their Right to Equal Access More Than the Right
of Public School Students?
In North Carolina, the rules and interpretations that exclude
nonpublic students from participating in public school programs burden
their right of equal access more than the right of public school students.
Nonpublic students are prohibited from most public school programs and
have no absolute right to participate in any of them. Public school
students, however, have full access to all public school programs. Thus,
this article argues that these rules and interpretations disproportionately
burden the rights of nonpublic students.
However, the counterargument is explicit in Thomas.' 68 Arguably,
all children have the right of equal access to public schools, but once
students choose to attend a nonpublic school they forego this right.1 69 In
line with the reasoning in Snyder, this article argues that this
counterargument should fail in the absence of an explicit constitutional
or statutory requirement of full-time attendance. 170 Therefore, nonpublic
students' right of equal access is disproportionately burdened.
3. Is There a Compelling State Interest to Burden the Right of
Nonpublic Students?
If the State of North Carolina decided to oppose a litigant who
asserts that excluding nonpublic students violates equal protection, it
167. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (N.C.
1994).
168. Thomas, 443 A.2d at 626-27.
169. Id.
170. Snyder, 365 N.W.2d at 158-59 (holding that since a state statute purports to give right of
equal access to public school without requiring full-time status, nonpublic students have the right to
participate in some public school programs on a part-time basis).
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would have to cite a "compelling government interest" for burdening the
fundamental right of equal access to public schools. 7  Though it is
impossible to speculate on every conceivable interest the State might
posit, two such interests are likely candidates.
a. Burden of Exclusion is Necessary to Promote Efficient
Administration of Public Schools
In Thomas, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland refused to
recognize a right to attend public school programs in order to avoid
placing an "unreasonable burden ... on the efficient administration of
the public school system." 72 The State could argue that recognizing a
right to attend or right of equal access would financially drain the public
school system. However, as of late, the North Carolina Supreme Court
has been willing to enforce educational rights in the face of high
budgetary costs. 173
More fundamentally, the State could argue that it is simply
impossible to administrate the inclusion of tens of thousands of
nonpublic students, who each get to pick and choose a few public school
programs. However, since twenty-three states already allow nonpublic
students to participate in public school athletics, 174 and Michigan allows
them to participate in some classes, this argument would likely fail.
b. Burden of Exclusion is Necessary to Promote Patriotic and
Civic Indoctrination
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the United States Supreme Court
held that a state's interest in promoting patriotic and civil indoctrination
was a sufficient justification for passing a compulsory public school
attendance law.1 75  Possibly, the State could argue that it wants to
maximize the number of students exposed to the public school system to
promote the same indoctrination. Equal access for private and
171. State ex rel. Utilities Comm 'n, 446 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting Texfi Indus., Inc. v. Fayetteville,
269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (N.C. 1980)).
172. Thomas, 443 A.2d at 627.
173. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997) (remanding case to superior court for
proceedings consistent with the holding that North Carolinians have a state constitutional right to a
"sound basic education"); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 372-73 (N.C. 2004)
(affirming superior court order that North Carolina must "remedy constitutional deficiencies relating
to the public school education"); Tiller, supra note 50, at 899.
174. Batista & Hatfield, supra note 5, at 224.
175. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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homeschool students would arguably make a nonpublic education more
desirable. Thus, equal access might lessen the number of full-time
students in public school and defeat the State's goal of indoctrination.
However, this argument should fail for two reasons. First, it is
impossible to predict if allowing part-time participation would spark a
mass exodus of students from public to nonpublic education. Second,
many nonpublic students, who might have never set foot in a public
school, would be exposed to some of the State's patriotic and civil
indoctrination. Thus, including these students could actually further the
State's interest.
4. Is There a Less Restrictive Means of Achieving the State
Interest?
There probably are less restrictive alternatives to promote the
efficient administration of public schools than simply excluding
nonpublic students. First, the rules and interpretations that exclude
nonpublic students are not narrowly tailored to their supposed purposes.
If money is the concern, the State could require that private and
homeschool families pay a nominal fee to compensate for the additional
administrative cost of registering their children. In terms of workability,
North Carolina could simply mimic the procedures of other states with
successful programs that allow a degree of equal access to public
educational facilities. 176  Second, there probably are less restrictive
alternatives to promote patriotic and civil indoctrination than simply
excluding nonpublic students. For example, the State could require that
a nonpublic student must enroll in one civics class to be eligible for
participation in other classes or sports.
In sum, the rules and interpretations that exclude nonpublic
students from public school programs implicate their fundamental right
of equal access to public schools and burden their right
disproportionately in relation to public school students. Furthermore, the
State likely cannot show this burden of exclusion is necessary to promote
a sufficiently compelling interest and there are less restrictive
alternatives to promote the State's goals and interests. Thus, the rules
that exclude nonpublic students violate equal protection under the North
Carolina Constitution.
176. Many states currently allow varying degrees of equal access to public educational facilities.
See supra notes 5 and 155 and accompanying text.
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B. State Statutory Right to Participate in Public School Programs
In North Carolina, private and homeschool families could advance
the same argument that partially succeeded in Snyder.' 77 Section 115C-1
of the North Carolina General Statutes grants "all children" and "every
person of the State less than 21 years old, who has not completed a
standard high school course of study" the right to attend public school for
free, without mentioning full-time status as a requirement. 78  Thus,
under Snyder's reasoning, any nonpublic student that would otherwise
qualify under the statute has a right of equal access to public schools. 1
79
IV. CONCLUSION
North Carolina is the perfect testing ground for private and
homeschool families to assert their state-level rights to participate in
public school programs. In North Carolina, equal access to public
schools is a fundamental right, 80 and any laws or regulations that burden
this right must survive strict scrutiny review.'"' Strict scrutiny is fatal in
fact,' 8  and, under the circumstances, it would render most arguments
against equal access virtually untenable.
Granting equal access to nonpublic students would be a watershed
moment in the educational rights movement in North Carolina, and some
courts might be unwilling to effect such a massive change in the legal
status quo. However, the Leandro decision indicates a willingness on the
part of the North Carolina Supreme Court to enforce the educational
rights provisions in the state constitution, even if enforcement costs the
State tens of millions of dollars. Finally, since every state constitution in
the nation has educational rights provisions, a state-level argument for
equal access can be made in virtually any American jurisdiction.' 83
Though this article focuses on the specific state constitutional and
statutory scheme in North Carolina and, to a lesser extent, in Michigan,
the implications of my argument are national. Today, there are millions
177. See Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d 151, 158-59 (Mich. 1984) (holding that
since a state statute purports to give right of equal access to public school without requiring full-time
status, nonpublic students have the right to participate in some public school programs on a part-time
basis).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-1 (2007).
179. See Snyder, 365 N.W.2d at 158-59.
180. Sneed v. Greensboro Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980).
181. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (N.C.
1994).
182. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005) ("Strict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact."').
183. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 10, at 118 n.5.
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of private and homeschool children, like the aforementioned Brenda of
Charlotte Christian Academy, who stand to benefit from equal access.
Arguably, the law and equity are on their side. The time has come to
recognize their state constitutional and statutory rights to participate in
public school programs on a part-time basis, and give every child the
chance to have the best of both worlds-private and public.
HeinOnline  -- 13 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 30 2007
